Introduction
This chapter introduces the concepts of subsidiarity and proportionality as twin constitutional principles and rules1 for mediating the balance of power between the eu and the Member States in the context of the development of eu law and the European integration process.2 They were adopted by the eu as legal rules to guide the eu law-making institutions when law-making in shared competence areas following the Treaty of Maastricht.3 The current law is located in Article 5(3) teu.4
The key aim of this chapter is to argue that despite the principle of subsidiarity being a key constitutional concept alongside proportionality in eu lawmaking for mediating the balance of power between the eu and the Member States in areas of shared competence that the principle of subsidiarity is also an essentially contested concept using Gallie's theory of essentially contested concepts.5 Such conceptual dissonance, it will be argued, favours judicial discretion on how it should be applied.6 Gallie's idea also helps elaborate on the more problematic character of principles and the difficulties this poses in adjudication. Legal reasoning by the cjeu needs to address this issue of discretion. A subsequent chapter will then consider how subsidiarity, as a contested concept, could be anchored in eu law by the cjeu to help ensure the proper respect for the division of power between the eu and the Member States in areas of shared competence and what could be agreed upon at European level. For by anchoring subsidiarity by using exemplars in order to demonstrate what is nearer to the heart of subsidiarity, this helps to minimise the risk of a dispute as to how it should be operationalized in adjudication. Such an approach would directly address a key concern raised by Gallie that essentially contested concepts are at continual risk of being disputed7 and provides a useful conceptual framework in this book for helping to identify the core of subsidiarity.
Subsidiarity as a Legal Principle and Rule
Subsidiarity as a principle in eu law has featured in academic literature from both from a legal and an economic perspective. From an economic perspective, Pelkmans has pointed out, economists have enjoyed a 'long tradition in studying subsidiarity as a functional principle'8 and have welcomed the principle as a useful one in determining what is best in terms of the overall welfare of a particular federal body in a multi-tier setting.9 For, as Pelkmans points principles namely that rules are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion whereas principles are 'a consideration including in one direction or another' , and thus principles have a dimension that rules do not. This is the dimension of weight or importance' . For further discussion on literature which highlights how disagreement and dissonance are present in the law more than judicial reasoning sometimes suggests and calls for judicial reasoning to engage more fully with such disagreement and dissonance see, for example, J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press, 1999), C. Finkelstein, 'Introduction to the Symposium on conflicts of Rights' , (2001) 
